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Evaluation of an In-Work Tax Credit Reform in Sweden: 
Effects on Labor Supply and Welfare Participation of Single Mothers
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The purpose of this paper is to evaluate a recent Swedish in-work tax credit reform where we 
pay particular attention to labor market exclusion; i.e. individuals in as well as outside the 
labor force are included in the analysis. To highlight the importance of the joint effects from 
the tax and the benefit systems it appears particular relevant to analyze the labor supply 
behavior of single mothers. To this end, we estimate a structural microeconometric model of 
labor supply and welfare participation. The model accounts for heterogeneity in consumption-
leisure preferences as well as for constraints in job opportunities. The results of the 
evaluation show that the reform generates welfare-gains for virtually every single mother, and 
moreover benefits low-income households. Finally, due to increased labor supply and decline 
in welfare participation we find that this reform is almost self-financing. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
During the recent decade a debate in the OECD countries on reforming the tax-transfer treatment of 
disadvantaged households has turned on two issues. The first one concerns the possibly large loss in 
efficiency due to disincentives and distortions on worker behaviour caused by high marginal tax rates 
for small and medium income levels. The second issue stems from the widespread observation that the 
system of transfers and benefits directly or indirectly related to supporting the life standard of 
disadvantaged households performs rather poorly in terms of cost-effectiveness. This concern 
motivated the Swedish Government to introduce an in-work tax credit reform in 2007, which was 
further extended in 2008. As a result of the reform the government expected a major reduction in the 
number of individuals depending on the welfare system
1. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the 
efficiency as well as the welfare effects from the 2008 version of the in-work tax credit reform for 
single mothers with particular focus on the “outsiders” of this group.  Single mothers stand out as the 
household type with the largest proportion of “outsiders” that strongly depend on support from the 
welfare system. Accordingly, it is of major importance to include “outsiders” in the population under 
study. However, since it might not make sense to assume that the “outsiders” face equally attractive 
job opportunities as the “insiders” it is strictly important to use a model of labour supply that account 
for heterogeneity in job opportunities. As will be demonstrated in Section 3 the random utility model 
(RUM) of household labour supply used in this study is particularly appropriate for dealing with 
heterogeneity in job opportunities
2. Our approach differs in important aspects from Blundell et al. 
(1987), who included unemployed people by using a generalized Tobit model. By contrast, the RUM 
framework allows for an integrated treatment of “insiders” and “outsiders” where it is accounted for 
heterogeneity in preferences for consumption-leisure as well as for possible differences in job 
opportunities.     
At this stage it is natural to ask the question whether the inclusion of the “outsiders” address 
an important economic problem. The Swedish case offers an illustration; Figure 1.1 shows that the 
number of whole year equivalent working age individuals that are supported by the benefit system has 
doubled since 1970 and at present accounts for more than one million people, or approximately 20 % 
of the working age population in Sweden. The largest group is those that receive disability pension, 
followed by long-term sick and unemployed persons. The conventional claim that these individuals 
will never be able to become employed is not supported by data. The increase of individuals outside 
the labor market cannot be explained by only exogenous changes, for instance health or medical 
reasons. Changes in compensation rates as well as in norms may partly explain the rise in the number 
                                                      
1 In Swedish the group consisting of unemployed, long-term sick and disabled  have been addressed as ”utanförskapet” 
which is most closely translated as the outsiders. For convenience this term will be used in this paper. 
2For previous applications, see Aaberge et al. (1995, 1999, and 2008).    3
of people supported by the benefit system, see e.g. Johansson and Palme (2002) and Lindbeck et.al. 
(2007). Due to the reduction in lower unemployment benefit and stricter monitoring, labor market 
exclusion has been reduced during the recent years. This paper will pursue the question of whether the 
implementation of the 2007/2008 in-work tax credit reform has contributed to a further reduction in 
welfare participation.  
(Figure 1.1 about here) 
 
The major motivation for introducing policies that reduce the number of individuals dependent 
on support from welfare is to reduce poverty as well as the central government budget expenditures. 
To reduce poverty during the active working age means reducing the risk of enduring health/mental 
problems as well as life-long poverty, see e.g. Beland, et. al. (2002). The central governmental budget 
effect on going from welfare to work is substantial. As an illustration, an individual that is moving 
from full time on disability pension to full time working yields a yearly net contribution of almost 
SEK 300 000
3. Thus, about 400 000 “whole-year equivalents” has a potential budget effect of SEK 
120 billion or about 15 % of total central governments expenditures (SEK 781 billion) in 2008.  
Several studies have evaluated the expected labor supply effects from introducing in-work tax 
credits in the US and the UK. The most recent and relevant studies for our purpose are for the U.K. 
Blundell and Hoynes (2004) and Duncan and Giles (1998) and for the U.S. Meyer and Rosenbaum 
(2001) and Fang and Keane (2004). The results from these studies suggest that there are strong 
incentive effects from tax credits. The broadening of the tax credit seems to have contributed to 
increased labor force participation and reduced welfare participation. 
Only a few studies have focused attention on the joint effects from taxes and benefits on single 
mother’s labor supply behavior and welfare participation. In a recent paper Flood et al. (2007) have 
analyzed the effect of an in-work tax credit on the labor supply and welfare participation of single 
mothers in Sweden. However, in contrast to this study, “outsiders” was excluded from the population 
under study. By contrast Lundgren et. al. (2008) provides an evaluation of the Swedish 2007/08 in-
work tax credit reform based on a binary logit models for unemployment, disability and long term 
sickness, whereas this paper offers an evaluation based on a structural modeling framework.  
The data used for this study is the 2004 wave from the Swedish Longitudinal Individual Data 
(LINDA). LINDA is completely based on register-information, and thus provides high-quality tax and 
income data. There is no problem with under-reporting of welfare participation which is a major 
problem in traditional survey-data. Moreover, LINDA combined with a detailed tax benefit program, 
provides very precise budget-sets for different hours of work combinations.  
                                                      
3 Own calculations, based on a large sample of individuals in the database LINDA who receive disability pension. We 
calculate the revenues from taxes (income and payroll), VAT, childcare fees and the expenditures on social assistance,   4
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main features of the Swedish income 
tax and benefit systems and the tax and benefit reform implemented in 2007. The microeconomic 
labor supply model and the corresponding empirical specification are presented in Section 3. Section 3 
also reports estimation results and wage and income elasticities of labor supply, whilst the data are 
described in Appendix 1. The social evaluation framework used in this study is presented in Section 4. 
Section 5 reports the results of the tax reform evaluation and Section 6 summarizes our findings.  
 
2. Income taxes and means-tested welfare programs in Sweden 
2.1. Taxes and benefits 
 
The Swedish income tax system consists of two parts, a flat municipal tax and a progressive 
national tax regime for earnings as well as for non-labour income. The individual is the taxation-unit 
and income taxes are independent of marital status. The flat municipal tax rate varies across 
municipalities; the average municipal tax-rate in 2007 was 31.55 percent, the lowest 28.89 and the 
highest 34.24. The national tax is based on three income-brackets. Incomes lower than SEK 340,900 
($37,054
4) are tax-free, while incomes up to SEK 507,100 ($55,120) were taxed by a 20 percent rate 
and incomes above SEK 507,100 were taxed by a 25 percent rate.   
Figure 2.1 displays the marginal and average tax rates for the income year 2008.  In order to 
highlight the importance of the in-work tax credit reform, Figure 2.1 also show taxes before the 
reform. The marginal taxes before the reform have an irregular shape up to SEK 340,900 ($37,054), 
the break point for governmental tax. This shape is explained by the phase-in and phase-out of a basic 
tax deduction. This basic tax deduction remains unchanged after the reform but the tax credit is 
designed such that it smooth’s the irregularities created by the basic deduction. The result is an 
increasing step-wise marginal tax rate with the following tax rates and kink points (for an average 
municipal tax rate).  Zero tax rate up to a taxable income of SEK 38,000, next 25 % up to SEK 
112,000, 31 % up to SEK 288,000, 32 % up to SEK 340,900, 52 % up to SEK 507,100 and finally 57 
%.  
 
(Figure 2.1 about here) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
housing allowance and disability pensions assuming full time market work and then for full time disability pension. On 
average the governmental budget effect of going from disability to work is SEK 287,659.   5
The distribution of gross (taxable) income show that most single mothers face a marginal tax 
rate close to the municipal tax rate, only a few reach the breakpoint for governmental tax rate and very 
few pay the highest rate. Evaluation of the impact of the tax reform shows that most single mothers 
face lower marginal tax rates. The only exception are those that have higher incomes than the 
breakpoint. Accordingly, the average tax rate declines for everyone with a positive labor income, but 
much more for low than for high incomes. However, since the tax credit only applies for income from 
work, the tax reform increase the incentives for transitions to job participation for those who did not 
work before the reform. The incentive effects for those who were working before the reform are 
mixed. Below the breakpoint the marginal tax rates have been reduced except for the second bracket. 
For high income earners located above the breakpoint, marginal taxe rates are unchanged but the 
average taxes have declined. Thus, a negative income effect might result in reduced working hours for 
high income earners. Finally, note that the reform results in a substantial tax cut, especially for low 
income earners. For an income of SEK 150,000 the average tax rate is 20 % and at 250,000 about 25 
%.  
Although the purpose of this paper is to evaluate the 2007/2008 tax reform the result of the 
evaluation might be biased if we don’t account for the impact of three means-tested programs; social 
assistance, housing allowance, and cost of childcare.   
Social assistance is supposed to be the ultimate safety net for people having temporary 
economic problems. Individuals are not entitled to social assistance if they have money in a bank 
account or other assets, which mean for example that unemployment benefits, national child 
allowance, sickness benefits, and various pensions, must be exhausted first. Social assistance is 
determined by nationwide rules supposed to provide “decent” living, and thus depends on household 
composition. To be entitled to social assistance, a household must have an income below the 
maximum benefit-level. There is then an implicit tax-rate of 100 percent on social assistance as 
household income increases.  
Housing allowance is also determined by nationwide rules. The amount of housing allowance 
a household is entitled is determined by household total income, rent, the number of children and the 
age of the parents. 
The maximum-childcare fee-reform, which was implemented in 2002, is based on household 
income, but only up to a rather low ceiling above which the fee is constant. For the first child the fee is 
3 percent, for the second child 2 percent, and for the third child 1 percent of gross household income. 
No fees are charged for further children. The ceiling is set fairly low, and as a result most households 
paid the monthly maximum amount SEK 1,260($137), 840($91), and 420($46) for the first, second, 
and third child in child care.    
Figure 2.2 illustrates how social assistance, housing allowance, and cost of childcare vary with 
                                                                                                                                                                      
4 Using a purchasing power adjusted exchange rate in 2007 of $1= SEK 9.20   6
disposable income for a low-income single mother with two children, ages 2 and 4. The two lines at 
the upper part of the graph show disposable income before and after the reform. This specific low-
income household will not receive increased income after tax by increasing labour supply from zero 
hours of work to more than 1,000 hours/year primarily because of reduced social assistance and 
housing allowance whereas cost for child care (shown as a negative number) plays a minor role. The 
two lines at the bottom of Figure 2.2 show taxes before and after the tax-credit reform. Since this 
household never reaches the break-point in the tax system, not even at 2,000 hours of work, taxes 
increase almost linearly. The tax cut produces a similar increase in disposable income once the income 
exceeds the ceiling for social assistance. The above discussion demonstrates that it is crucial for the 
tax reform evaluation to account for the fact that the tax cut is largely neutralized by the benefit 
systems for low income households. Otherwise there is a risk that the behavioral effect of the tax-
credit reform will be exaggerated. 
 
(Figure 2.2 about here) 
2.2. The in-work tax credit reform  
The implication of the reform, expressed in marginal and average taxes were discussed above, here we 
take a closer look at the profile of the in-work tax credit and the related basic deduction scheme.  
To avoid choosing low hours of work most in-work tax credits programs has a phase in region 
and to avoid an income support to wealthy households there is also typically a phase out region. 
However, the Swedish design, implemented in 2007 and further extended in 2008, differs from the 
mainstream design; it has no phase out region and the credit applies for all individuals with income 
from work, thus there is no low income target group. Moreover, unlike the US and UK reform the 
credit is not refundable.  
Figure 2.3 shows the profiles of the in-work tax credit system and the basic tax deduction 
scheme. The basic deduction, which all individuals can claim, reduces taxable income (the income 
base for municipal and governmental tax). The basic deduction have three levels depending on the 
level of taxable income; SEK 17,500, 31,800 and 12,100. The in-work tax credit, which is deducted 
from the tax rate, increase with taxable income and have three levels; SEK 0, 6,500 and 14,500. 
 
(Figure 2.3 about here) 
 
The tax credit reform applies for all individuals with an income from work. In the 
governmental budget proposal for 2008 the cost of this reform is estimated to about SEK 50 billion, 
when one presupposes that there are no behavioral effects from the reform. In a recent evaluation, 
allowing for changes in working hours, Lundgren et. al. (2008), report a slightly smaller deficit.    7
  Finally it should also be mentioned that the tax reform evaluated in this study also includes a 
change in unemployment benefit, implemented in 2007. This change is a reduction in the replacement; 
the highest rate is lowered from SEK 730 to 680 per day and from day 1-200 the replacement rate is 
80 %, from 201-300 70 % and after that 65 %. However, the effects reported in this study are 
completely dominated by the in-work tax credit. 
3. The Behavioral modeling framework 
3.1. The structural labor supply model 
The model used in this paper can be considered as an extension of the standard multinomial logit 
model and differs from the traditional models of labor supply by characterizing behavior in terms of a 
comparison between utility levels rather than between marginal variations of utility
5. We assume that a 
single mother chooses a "job" from a choice set B that may differ across individuals. Each job 
alternative in B contains a wage rate w, hours of work h and other observed and unobserved (for the 
analyst) job characteristics s and k such as environmental characteristics and skill content of the job, 
and whether or not the single mother is eligible for social assistance benefit. Moreover, B contains also 
non-market activities (i.e. alternative allocations of "leisure"), i.e. jobs with w=0 and h=0 that can or 
cannot be combined with receipt of social assistance benefit. The utility functions for single mothers 
are assumed to be of the following form 
 
(3.1)  () (, , ( ) ) , , , , ( (, , ( ) ) , , , ) ( , , , , ) U f w hIbz hzsk vf w hIbz hzs whzsk ε =  
where v and ε  represent the systematic and the random component, respectively, z =1 if the single 
mother receives social assistance (0 otherwise), b(z) is the social assistance benefit level (b(0)=0),  f  is 
a function determined by the tax and benefit rules that transforms gross income into income after tax, 
i.e. () ,,() f wh I b z  is disposable income (income after tax and benefits), I is exogenous income and k is 
a variable that is supposed to capture the impact of unobserved job characteristics. The reason for 
treating z as an endogenous variable is due to the fact that there can be negative effects associated with 
receiving social assistance, which might explain why some people that are eligible for social 
assistance benefit don’t receive it
6.  The random term ε  accounts for the effect on the utility of all the 
                                                      
5 This approach has been used by Aaberge, Dagsvik and Strøm (1995), Aaberge, Colombino and Strøm, (1999 and 2004) and 
Aaberge,  Colombino and Wennemo (2006). A simplified discrete version of this approach has been used by e.g. Dickens 
and Lundberg (1993), Euwals and van Soest (1999), Flood, Hansen and Wahlberg (2004) and Labeaga, Oliver and Spadaro 
(2007).   
 
6 In Moffit (1983) this is referred to as a stigma effect.   8
characteristics of the job match which are observed by the individual but not by the analyst and thus 
accounts for variation in tastes for a given job across individuals as well as across job opportunities for 
a given individual. Thus, the single mothers are assumed to make their labor supply choices according 
to (3.1).  
  By assuming that ε  is type I extreme value distributed and that the specification (3.1) is valid, 
it turns out that the probability density that opportunities with hours h and wage rate w in sector s, 
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  00 01 10 11 ,, p pp a n d p   are the proportions of opportunities in B that are non-market opportunities where 
the single mother is not eligible for social assistance benefit, non-market opportunities where the 
single mother is eligible for social assistance benefit, market opportunities where the single mother is 
                                                       
7 For the derivation of the choice density (3.2), see Aaberge, Colombino and Strøm (1999). Note that (3.2) can be considered 
as a special case of the more general multinomial type of framework introduced by Dagsvik (1994).   9
not eligible for social assistance benefit and market opportunities where the single mother is eligible 
for social assistance benefit . Thus,   00 01 10 11 1 ppp p + ++= . Furthermore,  (, ,,) ghwsz is the density of 
choice opportunities which can be interpreted as the relative frequency (in the choice set) of 
opportunities with hours h and wage rate w in sector s, where the single mother is ( 1 z = ) or is not 
(0 z = ) eligible for social assistance benefit. 
Opportunities with  0 = h (and 0 = w ) are non-market opportunities (i.e. alternative allocations 
of "leisure"). Note that the sector variable s vanishes and is replaced by the symbol ⋅ in this case. 
Thus, the density defined by (3.2) - (3.4) will form the basis of estimating the parameters of the utility 
function and the choice sets. 
3.2. Empirical specification 
Since we observe the chosen job (s, h and w) and whether the single mother is social 
assistance recipient or not, the density (3.2) – (3.4) will form the basis of estimating the parameters of 
the utility function and the choice sets. To this end we use the following specification of the systematic 
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where L is leisure, defined as  () 18 7 3 6 =− Lh ,s = 1 if the job belongs to the private sector (= 0 
otherwise), z=1 if the level of social assistance is  equal or above  SEK 12,000 and 0 otherwise, A is 
age and Ch1, Ch2 and Ch3 are number of children below 1-5, 6-12 and 13-17 years old, t=1 if the 
individual is involuntary unemployed, disabled or suffer from long-term sickness,  and the Q-variables 
are defined in Table 2.1. Note that the latter term of (3.5) captures the possible disutility from being a 
social assistance recipient. 
In the specification of the probability density of opportunities  00 (, ,,) p ghwsz we will assume 
that offered hours and offered wages are independently distributed. The justification for this is that 
offered hours, in particular normal working hours, are typically set in rather infrequent negotiations 
between employers and employees associations, while wage negotiations are far more frequent in 
which the hourly wage tend to be set independent of working hours. For the sake of estimation it is 
convenient to divide both numerator and denominator by  00 p  and define  01 01 00 gp p =  and   10
11 0 0 zz gp p = . Thus, we specify the density of opportunities in sector s requiring h hours of work and 
paying hourly wage w as follows 
 
(3.6)  () 11 2 3 ,, , () ( ) ( ,) zs s g ghw sz g wg hg sz =      
      
where   12 3 () , () ( ,) ss gwgh a n d g s z  are respectively the densities of wages, hours, and opportunities in 
sector s with and without eligibility for social assistance benefit, given that the opportunity is a market 
job.  
       





01 1 2 3
0,1 0,1 00
(, ,,)
( (, , ( ) ) , , , )( )( ) ( , )





vfw hIbz hzsg wg hg sz




⋅+ ⋅ + ∑∑∫∫
    
for { } ,0 hw >  and 
(3.8)
 












⋅+ ⋅ + ∑∑∫∫

      




( (0, ,0),0, ,0) 0
()
( (0, , (1)),0, ,1) 1,
vf I i fz
mz
vf Ib g i fz
⋅= ⎧
= ⎨ ⋅ = ⎩
    11
Let us now turn to the specification of the opportunity sets given by the 
distributions 12 3 () , () ( ,) ss g w g h and g s z . The sector-specific densities of offered wages are assumed 
to be lognormal with mean that depends on length of schooling (Ed) and on past potential working 




01 2 3 14 2 log
100 100
s ss s s s
Exp Exp




where η is standard normally distributed. 
The sector-specific distributions of offered hours are composed by three segments which 
include a possible peak corresponding to full time (ft, 35.5 – 40.5 weekly hours) and different 
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where  H is the maximum observed value of h. Since the density values must add up to 1,  3 s γ  for 
s=0,1 is given by 
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(3.13)    
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where z=1 if the available job opportunity (in sector s) can be combined with being a social assistance 
recipient. In Table 4.1 we refer to γ and μ as the parameters of the job opportunity density. 
  
 
3.3. Estimation results and labor supply elasticities 
3.3.1. Estimation results 
The estimated parameters of the labour supply model are presented in Table 3.1 and 3.2. Since 
the model are rather complex and several parameters capture non-linear or interaction effects most 
parameters don’t offer a simple straightforward interpretation.  
The estimates displayed in Table 3.1 imply that the deterministic part of the utility function is 
an increasing and strictly concave function of leisure and consumption. The crucial parameters of the 
utility function are the shape parameters α1 and α3. These parameters are measured with high 
precision. Moreover, the marginal utility of leisure also depends on personal characteristics such as 
age and number of children for different ages, on whether the job is in the private or public sector and 
on an indicator for “outsider”. As expected young children have a positive effect on the value of 
leisure, however there is no significant effect from the presence of older children. The parameter α10 
associated with choice of sector is not significantly different from 0 which suggests that that it is 
equally easy to combine being a single mother and work in the private as in the public sector. The 
effect of being classified as an “outsider” (α11) shows a strong positive effect on the value of leisure, 
which of course reflects low working hours in this group. However, note that the modeling framework 
used in this study also account for the fact that “outsiders” face poorer job opportunities than 
“insiders”. 
 
(Table 3.1 about here) 
 
The estimated parameters (τ1-τ7) of the disutility from being a social assistance recipient show 
that foreign born single mothers have a smaller disutility (smaller stigma) than an ethnic Swedish 
single mother. Moreover, single mothers with young children and low education get less disutility than 
single mothers with older children and higher education. Given that the mother is entitled to social 
assistance (an income below the norm), the model predicts that the take up ratio is higher for 
individuals with a small stigma effect. 
Table 3.2 presents the parameters for the job opportunity densities. The estimated θ parameter 
shows as expected that more non-market opportunities than market opportunities allow to be 
combined with the receipt of social assistance benefit. By comparing the µ parameters of Table 3.2 we   13
find that “outsiders” face fewer job opportunities than insiders. However, since  41 μ  is not significantly 
different from 0 we cannot claim that the number of private sector opportunities which allow 
combination with the receipt of social assistance benefit differ between “insiders” and “outsiders”.  
The estimated distributions of offered hours of work show a clear peak for full-time jobs in the public 
sector whereas there are fewer jobs with overtime hours than with part-time hours. By contrast, the 
private sector offers fewer part-time than jobs with overtime.  Finally, as is demonstrated by Table 3.2 
all coefficients of the wage densities are precisely estimated with signs as expected. Wages are strictly 
concave functions of experience and increasing with education. 
 
  (Table 3.2 about here) 
3.3.2. Wage and income elasticities 
To provide further information of the empirical model this sub-section presents labour supply 
elasticities. The wage elasticities are computed by means of stochastic simulations of the model since 
we (as analysts) do not observe all variables affecting preferences and opportunity sets. Draws are 
made from the distributions related to preferences and opportunities. Given the responses of each 
individual we then aggregate over the individuals to get various types of aggregate elasticities. Table 
3.3 displays these elasticities. Since many individuals in this labor supply model of discrete choice 
will not react to small exogenous changes, the elasticities in Table 3.3 has been computed as an 
average of the percentage changes in labor supply from a 10 percent increase in the wage rates.  
 
(Table 3.3 about here)  
 
The second column of Table 3.3 gives the unconditional elasticities of labor supply, which 
means that the effects on participation as well as hours supplied are accounted for. The third column 
displays the elasticity of the probability of participation and the last column displays the elasticity of 
hours of work conditional on working. First row summarizes the average results for all individuals. 
The unconditional elasticity is 0.34, the most important effect is on the probability of working, 0.3, 
whilst the effect on hours given work is 0.1. Moreover, as found in similar studies on Italian (Aaberge 
et al., 1999) and Norwegian (Aaberge et al., 1995, 2008) data the elaticities show to decline sharply 
with income. For the poorest decile the wage elasticities are numerically quite high. 
The estimated income elasticities are reported in Tables 3.4.  Non-labor income comprises 
several income categories, which are unevenly distributed among households and do not change 
uniformly in our simulation experiments. Since the income elasticities are household specific, the 
aggregate labor supply response to a shift that involves changes in non-labor income is the result of a 
complex calculation. Table 3.4 shows how the elasticity of labor supply with respect to changes in 
these incomes depend on the location in the income distribution. Except for high income households,   14
the income effect is rather small which is consistent with results obtained for Italian and Norwegian 
data. 
 
3.3.4. Prediction performance  
A comparison of the observed and simulated distribution of working hours is given in Figure 3.1. 
Based on the estimated model simulated hours closely mimic the observed. The peak at zero hours as 
well as full time is closely replicated. Figure 3.2 gives the corresponding information only for the 
“outsiders” and again we find that the model reproduces the observed distribution of hours of work 
quite well. 
 
(Insert Figures 3.1 and 3.2 here) 
4. The social evaluation framework 
Since the microeconomic model that is used in this study allows variation in preferences for 
consumption and leisure as well as in other observable and unobservable market and non-market 
opportunities it does not make sense to treat the estimated utility functions as comparable individual 
welfare functions. This is simply due to the fact that the social planner normally is unable to provide a 
convincing justification for discriminating between different preferences
8. Thus, it is required to 
introduce measures of individual welfare that justify interpersonal comparisons. Section 4.1 explains 
the method used for dealing with this problem, whereas Section 4.2 discusses the methods that will be 
used for aggregating individual welfare levels. 
 
4.1. Specification and estimation of individual welfare functions 
As is universally recognized a social planner needs to compare gains in welfare of some to losses in 
welfare of others as part of the evaluation of a tax reform. It is non-controversial to assume that each 
individual's welfare increases with increasing income and leisure as is also captured by the household-
specific utility functions. However, since the preferences as specified in the behavioral model are 
heterogeneous, we face the problem of interpersonal comparability when the individual utilities are 
assumed to represent individual welfare levels. To solve the comparability problem the social planner 
may introduce an individual welfare function (a common utility function)
9 which can be considered as 
                                                      
8 See Boadway et al. (2002) and Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006) for a discussion of interpersonal comparability of utility 
when preferences for leisure differ between individuals. 
 
9 Hammond (1991) argues for using a common utility function (individual welfare function) for all possible types of 
individuals. The common utility function determined by the social decision-maker justifies interpersonal comparability of 
both welfare levels and welfare differences.  
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an integral part of the framework that the social planner uses as a basis for evaluating policy reforms. 
The formal definition of the individual welfare function (V) determined by the social planner is given 
by eq. (3.5) where all variables, except income (after tax) and leisure, are replaced by the mean values 
of the sample. However, since the conclusions of the analysis may depend on the choice of the 
common utility function, a sensitivity analysis will be provided. To this end, we employ two additional 
alternative common utility functions derived from (3.5), where all variables, except income and 
leisure, are replaced by respectively the mean values of the poorest 10 percent and the richest 10 per 
cent of the sample of single mothers. To avoid any confusion note that the common utility functions 
are solely used as a basis for the social evaluation; it is not used for simulating labour supply and 
welfare participation choices. Thus, the simulated choices are the result of the maximization of the 
individuals’ own utility function. 
4.2. Social Welfare Functions 
The informational structure of the individual welfare functions derived from (3.5) allows comparison 
of welfare gains and losses of different individuals due to a policy change. When evaluating the 
distribution of individual welfare effects of a tax system and/or a tax reform it is required to 
summarize the gains and losses by a social welfare function. The simplest welfare function is the one 
that adds up the comparable welfare gains (V defined by (3.5)) over individuals. However,  since the 
linear additive social welfare function provides equal welfare weights to the single mothers, 
independent of whether they are poor or rich, this specific welfare function ignores a possible trade-off 
between efficiency and distributive considerations. Concern for distributive justice requires that poor 
individuals are assigned larger welfare weights than rich individuals, which is captured by the 
following family of rank-dependent welfare functions
10, 
 
(4.3)      
1
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where  12 ... n VV V ≤≤ ≤ is the ordered individual welfare levels V, and pk(t) is a weight function defined 
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10 This family has its origin form Mehran (1976) and Yaari (1988). Several other authors have discussed rationales for rank-
dependent measures of inequality and social welfare, see e.g. Sen (1974), Hey and Lambert (1980), Donaldson and 
Weymark (1980, 1983), Weymark (1981), Ben Porath and Gilboa (1994) and Aaberge (2001).   16
 
Note that the ethical justification behind the family of social welfare functions defined by (4.3) is 
equally convincing as the justification behind the traditional expected utility type of welfare functions. 
The essential differences between these two approaches for measuring social welfare arise from the 
so-called independence axioms. Whilst the expected utility independence axiom requires that the 
ordering of distributions of individual welfare is invariant with respect to identical mixing of the 
distributions being compared, the rank-dependent independence axiom requires that the ordering is 
invariant with respect to identical mixing of the inverses of the distributions being compared. 
 
Note that the inequality aversion exhibited by Wk decreases with increasing k. As  , k kW →∞  
approaches inequality neutrality and coincides with the linear additive welfare function defined by 
 










= ∑ . 
 
It follows by straightforward calculations that  k WW ∞ ≤  for all k, and that Wk is equal to the mean  W∞ 
for finite k if and only if the distribution of V is the egalitarian distribution. Thus, Wk can be interpreted 
as the equally distributed individual welfare level. As recognized by Yaari (1988) this property 
suggests that Ik, defined by  






=− =  
 
can be used as a summary measure of inequality and moreover is a member of the “illfare-ranked 
single-series Ginis” class introduced by Donaldson and Weymark (1980). As noted by Aaberge 
(2000), I1 is actually equivalent to a measure of inequality that was proposed by Bonferroni (1930), 
whilst I2 is the Gini coefficient.
11 In this paper we will measure individual welfare level with a 
common utility function (see Section 4). 
  To ease the interpretation of the inequality aversion profiles exhibited by W1, W2, W3 and W∞ 
Table 4.2 provides ratios of the corresponding weights – as defined by (4.4) – of the median individual 
and the 1 per cent poorest, the 5 per cent poorest, the 30 per cent poorest and the 5 per cent richest 
individual for different social welfare criteria. As can be observed from the weight profiles provided 
by Table 4.2 W1 will be particular sensitive to changes in policies that affect the welfare of the poor. 
 
                                                       
11 For further discussion of the family {Ik : k=1, 2, ...} of inequality measures we refer to Mehran (1976), Donaldson and 
Weymark (1980, 1983), Bossert (1990) and Aaberge (2000, 2001).   17
Table 4.2. Distributional weight profiles of four different social welfare functions  




W3  W∞  
(Utilitarian) 
p(.01)/p(.5) 6.64 1.98 1,33  1 
p(.05)/p(.5)  4.32 1.90 1.33  1 
p(.30)/p(.5)  1.74 1.40 1.21  1 
p(.95)/p(.5)  0.07 0.10 0.13  1 
 
  For a given total welfare (i.e. the sum of individual welfare levels) the welfare functions W1, 
W2, and W3 take their maximum value when everyone get the same welfare level.  
 
5. Evaluation of the 2007-08 tax-credit reform 
 
5.1 Income, welfare and working hours 
 
Table 5.1 summarizes the welfare effects of the tax reform based on three alternative common 
utility functions. One where the exogenous variables of the deterministic part of the utility function are 
replaced by the sample mean values, the second by the mean values of the poorest (in terms of 
income) 10 per cent and the third by the mean values of the richest 10 per cent. The results show that 
the overall mean welfare increases between 3.3 and 5.3 per cent; depending on whether one uses the 
common utility function based on the exogenous mean values of the poorest or the richest income 
decile. Moreover, the results for the winners are very similar, whereas there are larger variation in 
welfare means across deciles when using the poor related common utility function. Note that the 
identification of the proportions of winners and losers solely requires ordinal utility information. Thus, 
the estimates of the proportions of winners and losers are independent of the choice of common utility 
function. As demonstrated by Table 5.1 a majority of 63.3 per cent has gained from the in-work tax 
credit reform. However, there is also a large part with unchanged welfare (33.9 per cent) and hence 
less than 3 per cent who has lost. The proportions of gainers and losers vary across deciles of the pre-
tax income distribution. For the 10 per cent poorest individuals there are equally many with unchanged 
utility as there are winners. The reason for unchanged welfare is that these individuals don’t change 
their labor supply and that their incomes are below the norm for social assistance. Hence, as illustrated 
in Figure 2.2, the tax credit has no effect on disposable income and therefore income remains the same 
as before the reform. Who are the losers? For the low income households, the main explanation is that 
they get income from social assistance before but not after the reform. As indicated by Figure 2.2 an 
increase in working hours might not result in an increase in disposable income or only a small   18
increase, as long as the income is below the norm. A small or zero increase in disposable income and 
sometimes large increase in working hours result in a decrease in utility. 
As income increases the proportion of gainers also increase, although not monotonically. Note 
that also at higher income there are some individuals that are losers; the reason is again social 
assistance and as we have mentioned before social assistance is an in-work benefit and even at 
relatively high income an individual can be eligible.   
 
(table 5.1 about here) 
 
Table 5.2summarizes the results of the reform on household disposable income.  The static 
evaluation, no change in working hours, shows that, on average for all individuals, disposable income 
increased by 4.7%, the corresponding dynamic result is 5.7%. Table 5.3 shows that this difference is 
explained by an average increase in working hours by 2.7%. This might give the impression that 
allowing for changes in working hours does not have a major effect. However, across the income 
distribution the results are dramatically different between the static and dynamic evaluation. The 
average increase in disposable income for all individuals with a before reform net- income below the 
10’th percentile is almost 10% in the dynamic evaluation compared to only 2% in the static. This is in 
accordance with expectations, the work requirement makes work pay and this has an effect on the 
lower income where participation rates and hours are low.  
  
  (table 5.2 about here) 
 
The overall participation rate is 0.83 compared to only 0.36 in the lowest income decile. For the low 
income households the reform results in an increase in participation more than 20 %, and an increase 
in hours of almost 40 %. There is a strong effect on the participation rate up to percentile 30 but a 
much smaller effect for higher income. The effect on hour’s conditional on working, the intensive 
margin, is in general much smaller but still a sizable effect on those below the third decile, note that 
for higher income there is even a small decrease in hours. For higher income the income effect of the 
tax cut dominates whereas for lower income it is the substation effect. But again the most important 
effect is the increased participation rate. 
 
(table 5.3 about here) 
 
  Of course the change in working hours also affects social assistance. Table 5.4 shows that  
welfare participation drops by almost 20 % and the amount more than  17 %. Again, these effects are 
much stronger compared to a static evaluation and also the distributional impact is completely   19
different. For household with a low income (below decile 4) there is a decrease in participation 
between 22-30 %. Note that even high income household has a decrease. This is partly due to the fact 
that social assistance reflects family size and if the mother has many children it is possible to get 
assistance even if earnings are relatively high, but it also reflects that income is high because social 
assistance is included in the income.  
 
  (table 5.4 about here) 
   
5.2. The cost of the tax and benefit reform 
 
In this section we focus on the effects on government tax revenues and expenditures. Total taxes and 
benefits were calculated for each household before and after the reform, and then the weighted 
population-sums were calculated. Revenues were calculated as the sum of income and payroll taxes, 
plus Value-Added Taxes (VAT) and also the childcare fees paid by household. The cost of the reform 
was calculated as the amount of housing allowances and social assistance received by the household. 
Table 5.5 summarizes the total effects of the reform with and without labor supply adjustments. 
Before the reform the net revenue is SEK 28,194 million (USD 3,065): The static evaluation shows 
that the net revenue drops 5 %. The major impact is the drop in income tax revenues, (16 %), payroll 
taxes and revenues from childcare fees does not change since earning are unchanged, however since 
disposable income increase VAT goes up (5%). On the expenditure side social assistance is reduced 
slightly (-2%).  
 
  (table 5.5 about here) 
 
  Allowing for labor supply adjustments, the drop in income taxes is smaller (-13 %) since 
earnings have increased due to an increase in working hours, payroll taxes, VAT and child care fees  
have increased as well. There is a strong reduction in both housing allowance (-7%) and social 
assistance (-17%).   
  To summarize, despite the large tax cuts the dynamic effects, shows that the reform was 
almost revenue-neutral, the decrease in 1 % implies a deficit of less than 300 million SEK, which 
correspond to less than 0,03% of total tax revenues in 2004. Government revenues from income taxes 
and childcare fees dropped but this was compensated for by increased revenues from payroll taxes and 
VAT, as well as reduced cost for housing allowance and social assistance.   20
6. Conclusions 
 
The results, accordingly to the estimated model, suggest that a 1 percent wage increase 
corresponded to an average increase in hours of work of 0.3 pecent, the main effect is on the extensive 
margin and the effects are much stronger on low income households than on wealthier households. 
The income effects are smaller.  
The main results of the evaluation of the tax reform show that on average, disposable income
12 
increased by almost 6 percent, working hours by almost 3 percent, whereas social assistance 
participation decreased by almost 20 percent. We found welfare-gains for almost everyone single 
mother. On average, there was a 6 percent increase in welfare for the entire population of single 
mothers. The most important effect of our reform was the increase in working hours for low-income 
households.  In the first income decile there was an average increase of almost 40 percent.   
The proposed tax and benefit reform proved to be more or less self-financed, due to the 
significant reduction in cost of social assistance.  
                                                       
12 Disposable income is defined as total income including social assistance housing allowance but excluding taxes and cost of 
child care.    21
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Appendix 1 
 Description of the data 
 
The data was taken from the Swedish register-based LINDA
13. LINDA consists of a 
large panel of individuals and their household members; the sample used in this study comes 
from the 2004 wave of LINDA. We included single mothers older than 24 and younger than 
56 with 1 to 5 children, the youngest being 17 year or younger. The lower age limit exclude 
the problem of modeling choice of education and the upper follows from the age limit of 
youngest children, only a few full time students older than 25 were excluded. Information on 
incomes, wages, transfers, taxes, educational attainments was obtained from various 
government registers.  
The definition of a household is a problem in most administrative data, and LINDA is 
no exception. For economic analysis the most natural would be to define “household” as an 
economic unit, but since LINDA is based completely on register information it is not always 
possible to get correct information about the household composition. There is then a 
possibility that the number of single mothers may be overestimated if, for instance, she is 
living together with a man without being married and without having common children. We 
have not tried to adjust for this, but according to alternative data sources
14, which are survey-
based and therefore use an economic definition, the differences are quite small. About 5 % of 
all households in Sweden 2004 can be classified as headed by single mothers.   
Wage data was collected from the official statistics by Statistics Sweden, based on 
employers’ reports. Employers report monthly earnings, expressed in full-time equivalents 
and giving the amount the individual would have earned if working full-time. To obtain 
hourly wage rates, the monthly earnings are divided by 165. Yearly hours of work, h, is then 
defined as total labor earnings divided by the hourly wage rate. The hourly wage rate used 
here is quite different from that obtained by dividing observed earnings by observed hours, 
which has a tendency to include measurement errors. The data used here is not subject to the 
same problem. However, there are missing values from the employers reported earnings and 
if there is a positive reported income from work but no monthly earnings reported from the 
employer, then we delete that individual. Thus, we are deleting some of the workers and to 
                                                       
13 For a description of LINDA see Edin and Fredriksson (2000). 
14 Statistics Sweden (2004), Income distribution Survey 2004.   25
compensate for this we have also deleted some non-workers randomly in order to keep the 
participation rate intact. We ended up with a sample of 3,600 single mothers. 
As usual, a remaining problem is that wage rates are missing for non-working 
individuals. Note that the labor supply model also includes estimation of a wage equation. 
Still a wage equation is estimated and based on the estimates predicted mean values and 
variances are used for data generation. 
The total income of a household consists of both earned and unearned income. 
Unearned incomes include any capital gains, the national child allowance, and any child-
support payments. Unemployment benefits and other transfers that depend on labor supply 
were excluded from our measure of unearned income.  
Unfortunately, there is no information in LINDA about housing rent or about how 
many households use municipal childcare. Therefore, the rent of housing was imputed using 
information from an alternative data source, the Swedish Household Income Survey 2004, 
also supplied by Statistics Sweden. In the imputation we used the method of minimum-
distance, using age, number of children, earnings, place of residence, and citizenship as 
classification variables. The childcare fees could still be calculated since the rules are known 
and since the take-up ratio is high we assume that everyone utilize municipal child-care.  
In LINDA there is register-information on the number of months each household 
received social assistance (as well as the amount received), but not which months.
15 Thus we 
were not able use monthly data in the analysis, but instead aggregated all information to an 
annual basis. A household is then defined as a recipient if it received more than SEK 12,000 
during the year. Most of the SA-households received benefits for a short period. Of all the 
SA-recipients, about 60 % received it for six months or less.  
To generate disposable income for various combinations of hours of work and welfare, 
we use a modified version of the micro-simulation model (FASIT).
16 FASIT contains very 
precise information on income tax rules, as well as eligibility-rules for a number of welfare 
programs, such as social assistance and housing allowance. It also enabled us to calculate cost 
of childcare. Access to a simulation-model such as FASIT was essential for calculating 
accurate (net) household incomes, conditional on labor supply, because income tax rules and 
the various welfare benefit-levels are complicated functions of earned and unearned income.  
The variables included in the utility function were: age, education, dummy variables 
                                                       
15 Having access to register-data on welfare participation is a great advantage compared to interview-data, as 
there is no under-reporting of welfare participation in register-data.   26
for the age of the children; a dummy variable indicating if the single mother was born in 
Sweden; and finally, years of experience. 
In this study the sample has been divided into employed, unemployed, long-term 
sickness, disability pension and also voluntary non-workers (individuals not supported on 
unemployment or sick/disability benefit). The classification into these groups is done 
according to the income source. An individual with the bulk part of her income from work is 
classified as employed, if most of the income comes from unemployment benefit the 
individual is classified as unemployed and so on. The income limits has been selected in such 
way that the results is comparable to information from Statistical Sweden, based on the labor 
force study. 
Table A.1 presents descriptive statistics for the sample used for the empirical analysis.  
The information is given for the total as well as for each sub-group. The bottom line shows 
that out of the total 3,600 households, 73 % are employed and 6 % classified as other that is 
individuals without support from disability/sickness/unemployment-benefit. The “outsiders” 
are of equal size, unemployed 7 %, disability and sickness 6 %. In general, the characteristics 
of the non-employed individuals differ from the employed. For instance, only 2 % of 
individuals classified as disabled have the highest education compared to 18% for the 
employed. Age and years of experience indicate that unemployed are younger and disabled 
are older. The distribution of children is similar with the exception that the younger children 
are more frequent amongst unemployed and other. Among those employed almost 70 % are in 
the public sector.  
 
  (table A.1 about here) 
 
For the distribution of income and working hours across the different groups, it is 
important to remember that the outsiders can work part of the year. It follows from the 
statistics that the overall participation rate is about 80 % and that a large share of unemployed 
and long-term sick have had some working spell during the year but much less so for 
disabled. However, information on working hours shows that they had worked few hours. 
Since working hours and distribution of hours is of a major interest in this study Figure 5.1 
gives the frequencies for working hours for the full sample and Figure 5,2 for the “outsiders”.  
The high ratio of non-participation and the presence of short working hours is a result of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
16 FASIT was developed and is used by Statistics Sweden and the Swedish Ministry of Finance.    27
including the “outsiders”. 
Income from work of course reflects working hours and to some degree differences in 
wage rates. Non-labor income includes income of capital and some non-means tested 
transfers. Note that the mean of non-taxable non-labor income is negative, thus loans are 
frequent especially for those with a labor income. Even if there are large differences in labor 
income as expected the differences in disposable income is much smaller. 
Disability/sickness/unemployment-benefit as well as social assistance is the main explanation. 
On average 6% of the sample has received more than SEK 12,000 during the year. It follows 
that there is a large across-group variation; from 66 % for “other” to 1% for employed.  
   28
Tables 
Table A.1. Descriptive statistics a 2004 Linda sample of single mothers 
 
Variable Total  Disability Unemployed Other Sickness Working
Age  40.72 43.39  37.67  39.14 39.69  41.01 
Highest education first level  0.16 0.37  0.20  0.50  0.24  0.11 
Highest education secondary level  0.69 0.61  0.74  0.46  0.68  0.71 
Highest education tertiary level  0.15 0.02  0.06  0.04  0.07  0.18 
Years of working experience  19.84 23.87  17.47  20.75 19.83  19.65 
Born in Sweden yes=1  0.83 0.75  0.72  0.54  0.81  0.87 
Number of children age 0-5  0.13 0.09  0.27  0.30  0.15  0.10 
Number of children age 6-12  0.60 0.43  0.78  0.83  0.69  0.57 
Number of children age 13-17  0.70 0.87  0.51  0.61  0.71  0.70 
Employed in public sector, yes=1
*  0.69 0.00  0.86  0.00  0.51  0.69 
Working, yes=1  0.81 0.04  0.58  0.00  0.46  1.00 
Yearly working hours  1 398  7  297  0  231  1 849 
Hourly wage rate  128 120  119  120  122  130 
Yearly earnings (WH)  194 842  2 059  46 078  3 364  159 460  243 424 
Yearly Taxable non-labor income  11 416  19 449  18 497  31 
261
10 514  8 661 
Yearly non-taxable non-labor income
**  -2 072  110  1 094  1 901  -1 427  -2 924 
Deductions
***  3 800  568  1 152  293  1 488  4 835 
Yearly Net income  197 471  173 638  170 291  146 
737
179 862  207 772 
Social assistance, yes=1  0.06 0.12  0.08  0.66  0.10  0.01 
Outsider, yes=1
****  0.21 1.00  1.00  0.00  1.00  0.00 
Share  1.00 0.06  0.07  0.06  0.08  0.73 
 
 
Source: LINDA 2004 
Note, Total sample size 3600 
*) Calculations based on 2703 individuals, who are 1=public and 0=privately employed and 297 individuals are 
not employed. 
**) The negative mean value is explained by negative capital. 
***) Deductions are mainly cost of commuting to work and part of premium for private pension savings. 
****) Unemployed, disability pension and long term sick, yes=1 
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Table 3.1. Estimates of the parameters of the utility function 
Variable Parameter  Estimate  Std.  Dev. 
Consumption      
  α1  0.63488 0.04636 
  α2  5.74491 0.14556 
Leisure      
  α3  -20.72082 1.40525 
Constant  α4  6.64993 2.72286 
Log age  α5  -3.51460 1.44434 
Log age squared  α6  0.47278 0.19464 
# children, 0 – 5 years old   α7  0.01753 0.01280 
# children, 6 – 12 years old  α8  0.00879 0.00544 
# children, 13 – 17 years old  α9  -0.00379 0.00476 
Employed in public sector   α10  -0.01846 0.01479 
Disabled, unemployed or long-term sick  α11  2.30343 0.55256 
 
Consumption * Leisure  α12  -0.16244 0.06622 
      
Disutility      
z × Q2=1 if children, 1 - 2 years old  τ1  2.19878 0.52755 
z × Q3=1 if children, 3 years old  τ2  2.05128 0.37065 
z × Q4=1 if children, 4 - 6 years old  τ3  0.75062 0.22771 
z × Q5=1 if children, 7 - 10 years old   τ4  0.72422 0.18283 
z × Q6=1 if children, 11 - 14 years old  τ5  -0.41188 0.18015 
z × Q7=1 if Nationality=Swedish (= 1)  τ6  -1.37997 0.18644 
z × Q8=1 if lowest education (de = 1)  τ7  1.56291 0.19105 
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Table 3.2.  Estimates of the choice set parameters. 
 
 Parameter  Estimate  Std.  Dev. 
Market relative to non-market social assistance opportunities  θ -5.53127  0.24647 
Job/social assistance opportunity      
public*social assistance 
11 μ   -7.45103 0.33621 
public*not social assistance 
12 μ   -5.16508 0.23798 
private* social assistance 
21 μ   -7.20378 0.44203 
private* not social assistance 
22 μ   -4.14759 0.28740 
public* social assistance *outsider 
31 μ   -1.79508 0.83901 
public* not social assistance *outsider 
32 μ   -3.08028 0.25691 
private* social assistance *outsider 
41 μ   0.63595 0.70360 
private* not social assistance *outside 
42 μ   -1.51998 0.24582 
Hours – Public sector      
Part time 
11 γ   0.48357 0.16771 
Full time 
12 γ   1.18056 0.12608 
Hours – Private sector      
Part time 
21 γ   -0.76408 0.20988 
Full time 
22 γ   0.12767 0.14307 
Wage – Public sector       
Constant 
10 β  
4.40299 0.01989 
Experience/100 
11 β  
0.88989 0.17190 
Experience squared 
12 β  
-1.59782 0.44083 
High school 
13 β  
0.11401 0.01193 
University 
14 β  
0.34577 0.01361 
Standard deviation 
1 σ   0.15377 0.00200 
Wage - Private sector      
Constant 
20 β  
4.40637 0.03188 
Experience/100 
21 β  
1.32833 0.28458 
Experience squared 
22 β  
-3.21117 0.70755 
High school 
23 β  
0.02743 0.01461 
University 
24 β  
0.20837 0.01955 
Standard deviation 
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under the pre- 
reform system 
Elasticity of unconditional 
expectation of hours ofwork 
Elasticity of the 
probability of 
participation 
Elasticity of conditional 
expectation of hours of 
work 
1 
4.69 2.73  0.64 
2 0.91 0.67  0.30 
3-8 0.22  0.16  0.06 
9 0.02 0.06  -0.04 
10 0.08 0.12  -0.04 
All 0.34  0.30  0.10 
 
Table. 3.4. Labor supply elasticities with respect to non-labor income for single mothers by 




Elasticity of  
unconditional 
expectation of  
hours of work 
Elasticity of the 
probability of  
participation 
Elasticity of  
conditional 
expectation of  
hours of work 
1 0.00  0.00 0.00 
2 -0.01  -0.04 -0.04 
3-8 -0.02  -0.03  -0.03 
9 0.01  0.00 0.00 
10 -0.08  -0.09  -0.09 
All -0.02  -0.03  -0.03 
 
1) the elasticities in Table 3.3 and 3.4 has been computed as an average of the percentage 
changes in labor supply from a 10 percent increase in the wage rates or non-labor income.   32
Table 5.1. Change in welfare by losers and winners, and by income deciles under the pre-reform 
tax system
1)   



















Change in welfare 
Per cent 
  I  II  III   I  II  III   I  II  III 
1  4,0  3,7  4,5  2,8  -12,5 -18,8 -5,3 46,9 9,7  11,8  7,8
2  4,7  4,2  4,2  1,4  -6,2  -8,9  -8,0  58,9  8,7  9,6  7,6 
3  3,9  3,6  4,2  1,6  -7,8 -8,0 -6,4 54,9 8,1  8,7  7,4
4  4,2  3,1  5,5  3,1  -5,5  -6,8  -4,8  57,4  7,9  7,9  7,7 
5  3,6  2,8  5,2  3,1  -5,0  -7,4  -4,5  52,6  8,0  7,2  7,9 
6  4,5  2,4  6,4  3,1  -3,5 -7,5 -4,8 63,9 7,5  7,8  7,6
7  4,6  3,3  6,1  1,1  -4,0  -5,4  -3,3  68,1  7,3  7,0  7,6 
8  5,4  3,5  6,3  1,1  -5,0  -4,2  -4,0  78,9  7,0  6,4  7,4 
9  4,6  3,6  6,0  0,8  -4,7 -4,8 -3,4 74,2 7,0  5,9  7,0
10  3,9  3,0  4,7  0,3  -3,0  -3,8  -1,5  76,9  5,1  4,7  5,3 
All  4,4  3.3  5,3  2,8  -5,3  -6,8  -4,3  63,3  7,4  7,1  7,2 
1)  I = common utility function defined in terms of the mean values of the single mothers 
   II = common utility function defined in terms of the mean values of the 10 per cent poorest single 
mothers 


















   33
Table 5.2. Direct and total effects on disposable income from the tax reform 
Income decile under 










1  115 809  1.96  9.58 
2  144 575  4.27  7.48 
3  158 883  4.44  6.70 
4  171 198  4.97  5.81 
5  182 753  5.44  5.89 
6  194 910  5.42  5.67 
7  207 730  5.27  5.51 
8  222 964  5.29  5.19 
9  241 172  5.11  5.02 
10  286 773  4.07  3.84 
All  192 677  4.74  5.73 
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Table 5.3 Effects on labour supply from the tax reform
 
 
Income decile under 
 the pre-reform system 













1  0.36 21.09  1  203  4.25  353  38.94 
2  0.75  5.56  1 460  2.61  1 033  7.92 
3  0.79  5.61  1 528  0.49  1 174  7.23 
4  0.86  0.65  1 701  0.05  1 381  1.35 
5  0.94  1.78  1 644  0.17  1 518  1.24 
6  0.93  0.90  1 797  -0.19  1 636  1.09 
7  0.91  0.61  1 868  0.17  1 665  0.50 
8  0.91  0.30  1 865  -0.21  1 705  0.19 
9  0.94  0.59  1 948  -0.36  1 816  -0.03 
10  0.93  1.20  1 974  -0.49  1 831  0.67 
1  0.36 21.09  1  203  4.25  353  38.94 
All  0.83  2.61  1 699  0.47  1 411  2.71 
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 Table 5.4 Effect on social assistance 
 
Income decile 
































1  19 583  -0.35  -23.91  0.32  0.00  -21.74 
2  11 861  -0.84  -25.55  0.17  -1.67  -30.00 
3  17 613  -1.54  -28.66  0.23  -3.66  -28.05 
4  8 045  -2.28  -9.94  0.11  -7.32  -12.20 
5  6 807  -1.61  -24.16  0.08  0.00  -18.52 
6  7 271  -3.13  -17.21  0.08  -6.67  -16.67 
7  9 316  -3.04  -8.81  0.11  -7.32  -14.63 
8  7 484  -1.83  -8.99  0.08  0.00  -6.90 
9  7 647  -2.87  -0.54  0.07  -4.17  -8.33 
10  16 621  -3.46  -7.93  0.11  -5.26  -10.53 
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Notes: The payroll tax is 32,28 % measured as a percentage of the wage rate net of payroll taxes. The VAT has 
been calculated as 20,6 % on 100% of net-income. 
 
 
  Before 
the reform
Change due to the reform






   
Income Taxes  11 929  -16  -13 
Payroll Taxes  11 693  0  3 
VAT  7 938  5  6 
Child care fees  613  0  4 
Expenditures      
Housing allowance  1 735  0  -7 
Social assistance  2 244  -2  -17 
      
Revenues-Expenditures  28 194  -5  -1   37
Figures. 





  Disability  Long term sickness  Unemployment  
  Labor market training  Social assistance 
 
Source: Governmental budget proposition (2008). 
 
   38





Note. For the income distribution use the scale on the right hand side.    39









Disposable income before Disposable income after Social assistance before
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Figure 3.2. Distribution of observed and predicted hours, outsiders 
 
 
  
 